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Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization: 
A Critical Look at the Stylized Facts 
A. JAVIER HAMANN*
Do exchange-rate-based stabilizations generate distinctive economic dynamics?
To address this question, this paper identifies stabilization episodes using criteria
that differ from those in previous empirical studies of exchange-rate-based stabi-
lizations. We find that, while some differences can be detected between exchange-
rate-based stabilizations and stabilizations where the exchange rate is not the
anchor, the behavior of important variables does not appear to differ—especially
output growth, which is good in both cases. There is also no evidence that fiscal
discipline is enhanced by adopting an exchange rate anchor, or that there are any
systematic differences in the success records of stabilizations that use the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor and those that do not. [JEL E31, E63]
I
n recent years, several articles have identified a set of empirical regularities that
arise during exchange-rate-based stabilization (ERBS) in high inflation coun-
tries. These empirical regularities are presumably not observed when the inflation
stabilization strategy does not rely on the use of the exchange rate and are, thus,
commonly referred to as the ERBS “syndrome.”1 The main features of the
syndrome include a boom-bust cycle (as opposed to the initial recessionary effects
of money-based stabilizations); a consumption (and sometimes also an invest-
ment) boom; a pronounced real exchange rate appreciation; and worsening trade
111
IMF Staff Papers
Vol. 48, No. 1







































*The author would like to thank Timothy Lane, Enrica Detragiache, Martin Uribe, and an anonymous
referee for their helpful comments, and Sibabrata Das for valuable research assistance.
1The main stylized facts of ERBS were identified by Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) and Végh (1992).
Calvo and Végh (1994) and Reinhart and Végh (1994) lend further support to the notion of an ERBS
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and current account balances. In addition, the literature points out that there is a
particularly high incidence of failure among ERBS in high inflation countries.
It is quite surprising that, although the identification of an ERBS syndrome
was based on a relatively small sample of countries from Latin America and Israel
and its relevance for other countries has not been studied, it has nonetheless
inspired a growing theoretical literature.2 There are also potentially serious
methodological problems with the way in which the comparison of ERBS with
other stabilizations has been usually carried out. Most importantly, there are
inconsistencies in the timing of ERBS and the typical control group of money-
based stabilizations (MBS), as the former presumably start when the exchange
rate is actually pegged whereas the latter are assumed to begin when they are
announced. In addition, there is no obvious reason why the control group against
which the ERBS have been compared should be confined to MBS; instead it
should include all non-ERBS, that is, a broader class of programs that includes
those where no strict monetary or exchange rate rule was pursued.3
This paper looks at the stylized facts of ERBS and other stabilization plans
where the exchange rate was not the anchor (OS), trying to correct some of the
problems mentioned above. To this end, the paper follows earlier work by Ball
(1994) and Easterly (1996) and constructs a set of inflation stabilization episodes
on the basis of a simple numerical rule. The timing of all inflation stabilizations,
ERBS and otherwise, is, thus, based on a common criterion. In addition to the
elements of the ERBS syndrome, the paper looks at the issue of financial disci-
pline, which, according to a widely held view, is enhanced by the use of the
exchange rate as an anchor. It must be stressed, however, that the paper is mainly
descriptive: it identifies patterns in the data and examines their robustness, rather
than carrying out formal tests of competing hypotheses. In this sense, the paper
should be viewed as a first attempt at establishing stylized facts on the basis of a
rule-based selection of inflation stabilization episodes, leaving formal testing of
other important issues for further research.4
The results are not totally supportive of the ERBS syndrome described in the
literature. While differences in the behavior of some macroeconomic variables
between ERBS and OS were detected, there is no evidence of a “recession now
vs. recession later” trade-off between ERBS and OS; in fact, growth performance
during stabilization is good in both groups, as had been found by Easterly (1996).
There is also no evidence that fiscal discipline is enhanced by the adoption of an
exchange rate anchor, or that there are any systematic differences in the records
of success of ERBS and OS. 
2See, for example, Mendoza and Uribe (1996, 1999), Rebelo and Végh (1996), Reinhart and Végh
(1995), Roldós (1995), and Uribe (1997).
3For example, a control group of only six MBS programs is used in Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) and
five MBS programs in Calvo and Végh (1994) and Reinhart and Végh (1994).
4A key assumption made in the papers that try to explain the ERBS syndrome is that the selection of
the nominal anchor is an exogenous decision. While this paper does not test formally the hypothesis that
anchor selection may be endogenous, it tries to shed some light on the issue by trying to identify system-
atic differences in the behavior of key macroeconomic variables in pre-stabilization years.I. Identifying Stabilization Episodes
The selection of the inflation stabilization episodes used in this study is based on
the application of some rules to a data set of annual inflation rates for the period
1960–1997 for a group of 143 countries.5 The alternative to a rules-based method
for selecting episodes would be a comprehensive review of the history of those
countries, aimed at identifying periods in which governments put in place anti-
inflation economic programs. This alternative route would necessarily entail some
controversial judgements regarding, for instance, whether to exclude programs
that could not be considered serious attempts at disinflation, or programs that were
abandoned soon after they were implemented. Furthermore, in most cases, identi-
fying the precise timing of stabilization episodes could be equally arbitrary. It is
not always the case that inflation stabilization programs have a clearly identifiable
start date, with the exceptions being perhaps those in which the exchange rate
played a central role and its future path was announced along with other
measures.6 It is often the case, moreover, that inflation is successfully brought
down after more than one attempt and, even in those cases, it is not entirely clear
when a given stabilization plan ended and the next one began. 
Another alternative would be to rely on existing work documenting stabiliza-
tion programs in high inflation countries. But those studies are not likely to
provide a comprehensive account of stabilization episodes. One of the purposes of
the present study is to examine a range of inflation stabilization episodes that goes
beyond the set that has been well documented in the literature. Furthermore,
doubts about the precise timing of the stabilization programs and consistency
across countries of the methodology for selecting relevant episodes are not likely
to be resolved by relying on a survey of existing studies of stabilization experi-
ences. However, it must be acknowledged that, whereas specifying a rule for
selecting inflation stabilization episodes simplifies the task of identifying episodes
enormously and does not discriminate against programs that have not been docu-
mented, it does not remove subjectivity completely from the analysis. Rules will
be unavoidably arbitrary but the patterns detected under one set of rules can be
checked for robustness with respect to small changes in the eligibility criteria.
Ball (1994) and Easterly (1996) have used rules for the identification of infla-
tion stabilization episodes. Building upon earlier work by Bruno and Easterly
(1995), Easterly (1996) defines a stabilization episode as a movement from an
“inflation crisis” to a “non-crisis” period where the former is defined as a period
of at least two consecutive years of inflation above 40 percent and the latter as a
period of at least two consecutive years with inflation below 40 percent. The two-
year minimum is used to eliminate spikes in inflation due purely to one-time price
shocks such as changes in key import prices, devaluations, or price liberalizations.
The 40 percent threshold level is found by Bruno and Easterly (1995) to be useful
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5This represents a sub-set of countries for which the IMF publishes data which excludes the eastern
European countries and the former republics of the Soviet Union. 
6Even in those cases, other stabilization policies may have been put in place before the announcement
of a path for the exchange rate, thus obscuring the timing of stabilization.in discriminating between periods of very high inflation and moderate to low infla-
tion. To establish the timing of stabilizations, Easterly defines the peak year during
the crisis period as “year 0,” or the stabilization year, and the year after the peak
as the first post-stabilization year.
Easterly found 28 stabilization episodes, shown under Criterion (1) in Table 1,
and his rule could be considered a relatively stringent criterion for the selection of
stabilization episodes. Notably, the list excludes a number of well-documented,
albeit mostly failed, stabilization attempts, including Argentina and Chile’s
tablitas of the late 1970s, and the heterodox programs of Argentina, Brazil, and
Peru in the mid-1980s. The sample also excludes several programs in Africa. In a
deliberate attempt to produce a larger sample, three alternative rules were used
here to identify stabilization episodes, all of them based on the requirement that,
prior to stabilization, inflation remained at or above 40 percent for at least two
years:
•  Criterion (2): stabilization occurs when inflation is brought down below 40
percent and remains below 40 percent for at least another year.
•  Criterion (3): stabilization occurs when the inflation rate is lowered by at least
one-quarter the first year and remains below the pre-stabilization level for at
least another year.
•  Criterion (4): stabilization occurs when the inflation rate is lowered by at least
one-half the first year and remains below the pre-stabilization level for at least
another year. The results of applying the three rules to the data are shown under
Criteria (2)–(4) in Table 1.7 Criterion (2) produces 34 stabilization episodes, of
which 22 coincide with those in Easterly’s sample.8The timing of stabilization,
however, tends to be delayed by a year in most cases, reflecting in part the fact
that Easterly’s selection was based on end-of-period inflation whereas in this
paper average inflation was used.9, 10 The fact that this rule does not produce a
very large number of episodes shows the discriminating power of the 40
percent threshold, since no minimum reduction in inflation is required. A
potential shortcoming of this criterion, however, is that it could pick up cases
in which inflation may have been lowered from slightly over 40 percent to
slightly less than 40 percent, which would not represent economically mean-
Javier Hamann
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7The following episodes were identified but are not included in Table 1: Nicaragua 1981 (as a large
share of prices were controlled by the government); and Afghanistan 1992, Equatorial Guinea 1986,
Guinea Bissau 1982, and Somalia 1991 (either because of unreliable inflation data or lack of data on other
variables also studied in this paper).
8Strictly speaking, the rule produced 28 episodes. Six additional episodes, denoted by italics in Table
1, were identified when the threshold was lowered to 35 percent in an attempt to capture “near misses.”
This exercise was also carried out for Criteria (3) and (4).
9The reason for this was the availability of data: there was a relatively large number of countries for
which the series of end-of-period inflation rates contained missing observations. As a result, annual
average inflation rates were used which, admittedly, will tend to push forward the stabilization date by one
year. The significance of this point is discussed later.
10Since the “stabilization year” is set here as the first year in which a meaningful reduction in infla-
tion takes place, and not as the peak inflation year as in Easterly (1996), dates for Criterion (1) in Table 1
have been adjusted to make them comparable to those obtained for Criteria (2)–(4).EXCHANGE-RATE-BASED STABILIZATION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STYLIZED FACTS
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Table 1. Stabilization Episodes
Stabilization Date
Easterly (1996) Alternative criteria: Date of IMF
(1) (2) (3) (4) Arrangement1
Argentina 1 1977 1977 August 1976
Argentina 2 1980
Argentina 3 1986 1986 March 1986
Argentina 4 1990 1992 1991 1991 May 1990
Bangladesh 1975 1975 1975 1975 June 1974
Bolivia 1986 1987 1986 1986 June 1986
Brazil 1 1965 1967 1966 January 1965
Brazil 2 1991 1991
Chile 1 1965 1965 January 1965
Chile 2 1974 1975 January 1974
Chile 3 1979 1977
Congo, Democratic
Republic of 1 1969 1969 1969 July 1967
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 2 1981 1980 1980 August 1979
Congo, Democratic
Republic of 3 1984 1985 1985 December 1983
Costa Rica 1983 1983 1983 1983 December 1982
Dominican
Republic 1991 1992 1992 1992 August 1991
Ecuador 1 1990 September 1989
Ecuador 2 1993 1994 1994
Ghana 1 1978
Ghana 2 1984 1985 1985 1985 August 1983
Guinea 1988 1988 July 1987
Guinea Bissau 1 1990 1990 March 1989
Guinea Bissau 2 1993 1993 1994
Guyana 1992 1992 1992 July 1990
Iceland 1 1975 1976 1976
Iceland 2 1984 1984 1984 1984
Indonesia 1967 1969 1967 1969
Israel 1985 1987 1986 1986
Jamaica 1992 1993 1993 1993 June  1991
Lebanon 1 1988 1988
Lebanon 2 1993 1993 1993
Mexico 1 1984 January 1983
Mexico 2 1988 1989 1989 1989 November 1986
Mozambique 1988 1988 June 1987
Nicaragua 1991 1992 1991 1991 September 1991
Nigeria 1989 1990 1990 1990 February 1989
Peru 1 1986 1986 April 1984
Peru 2 1991 1991 1991 September 1991
Peru 3 1994 March 1993
São Tomé & Principe 1992 1992 June 1989ingful stabilization episodes. In fact, only two marginal cases were picked up
and were dropped from the sample: Israel 1976 and Guinea 1982.
Unlike Criterion (2), Criterion (3) does not impose a uniform ceiling on post-
stabilization inflation but requires a reduction of at least one-quarter in inflation in
the first year of stabilization. This proved to be a significantly less restrictive crite-
rion, as it produced 51 stabilization episodes, including all 28 found by Easterly





Easterly (1996) Alternative criteria: Date of IMF
(1) (2) (3) (4) Arrangement1
Sierra Leone 1 1988 1988 November 1986
Sierra Leone 2 1992 1993 1992 1993
Somalia 1 1981 1982 1982 February 1980
Somalia 2 1985 1985 1985 February 1985
Syrian Arab Republic 1988 1988
Turkey 1 1981 1981 1981 1981 June 1980
Turkey 2 1986 April 1984
Uganda 1 1981 1982 1982 January 1980
Uganda 2 1988 1990 1989 1989 June 1987
Uruguay 1 1968 1969 1969 1969 June 1968
Uruguay 2 1976 May 1975
Uruguay 3 1980 1981 1981 March 1979
Uruguay 4 1992 December 1990
Venezuela 1991 December 1990
Zambia 1994 1994 July 1992
Total number of
episodes 28 34 51 36 41
Number of Easterly
(1996) episodes 28 22 28 22
Preceded by IMF 
arrangements 21 25 38 27
Sources: Easterly (1996), IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), and national sources.
1Date of nearest IMF arrangement, prior to earliest stabilization date among criteria (1)–(4).
(1) First year after peak inflation in a transition from a high inflation to a low inflation period.
The former is defined as at least two years of inflation above 40 percent and the latter as at least
two years of inflation below 40 percent.
(2) First of at least two years of inflation below 40 percent, following at least two years of infla-
tion above 40 percent.
(3) Year of at least 25 percent reduction in the inflation rate from a level of at least 40 percent,
preceded by at least another year of inflation above 40 percent. Inflation in the second year of stabi-
lization must remain below its level in the last pre-stabilization year.
(4) Year of at least 50 percent reduction in the inflation rate from a level of at least 40 percent,
preceded by at least another year of inflation above 40 percent. Inflation in the second year of stabi-
lization must remain below its level in the last pre-stabilization year.known episodes not captured by Easterly’s rule, mentioned earlier.11 Criterion (4),
which requires halving inflation as a minimum, produced 36 episodes, including
22 of the 28 identified by Easterly. It was decided, therefore, to carry out a
comparative study of the stylized facts that would arise from the two samples
produced by the most stringent and loosest criteria: Easterly’s and Criterion (3).
Since the episodes contained in the two samples to be used in this study were
selected exclusively on the basis of inflation performance, some additional informa-
tion that stabilization programs were actually put in place in those cases is needed in
order to rule out the possibility that the selected episodes represent positive supply
shocks. One way to deal with this issue is to check for the existence of IMF-
supported programs during a period of, say, up to two years prior to the stabilization
date identified in Table 1. Of the 55 episodes listed in Table 1, 41 were preceded by,
or coincided with, an IMF-supported program. Moreover, 38 of the 51 episodes
identified by Criterion (3) were preceded by or coincided with an IMF-supported
program, and there is further evidence that in most of the remaining 13 cases, stabi-
lization programs were put in place: Argentina 1980 actually represents its tablita
experiment, which ran from December 1978 to February 1981; Brazil 1999 is
President Collor’s stabilization plan of 1990–91; Indonesia’s “stabilization and reha-
bilitation” program, started in 1966, is documented by Azis (1994); the Israeli stabi-
lization plan has been analyzed extensively—Bruno and Piterman (1988) is the first
of several studies dealing with the Israeli stabilization; Iceland’s two stabilization
plans are reviewed by Andersen and Gu∂D∂mundsson (1998); and Ghana’s strategy to
mop up excess liquidity in 1978 is documented by Sowa (1993). Other episodes are
not well documented in the literature but clearly constitute bona-fide stabilization
programs: Lebanon’s 1993 stabilization is part of the economic reconstruction plan
started in 1991 following the Taif peace treaty, and Ecuador 1994 reflects the efforts
of that country’s authorities to bring down inflation through the active use of the
exchange rate as a tool to anchor expectations about inflation. Thus, of the 51
episodes identified associated with Criterion (3) there are only 4 for which there is
no independent evidence of the adoption of a stabilization plan: Guinea Bissau 1993,
Lebanon 1988, Sierra Leone 1992, and the Syrian Arab Republic 1988.
There are other problems associated with the identification of stabilization
episodes based exclusively on the actual behavior of inflation. First, since the
selected stabilization episodes are those for which a given reduction in inflation is
actually observed, it follows that the resulting sample is composed mainly of
programs that enjoyed some degree of success. Short-lived programs that did not
manage to make a significant dent in average annual inflation would not have been
picked up. Second, the rules may be picking up the delayed effects of programs
that pursued more than one objective at a time or, more likely, programs that
pursued a sequence of events, such as restoration of external balance first, and only
subsequently a reduction in inflation. Thus, either by pushing forward the timing
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11Table 1 shows a stabilization date of 1975 for Chile under Criterion (3) and 1977 under Criterion
(4). In fact, according to Criterion (3) a “stabilization” occurred every year in Chile in the period 1975–78,
but only the first year of this continuum is shown on Table 1. Under Criterion (4) this stabilization period
begins in 1977.of stabilization, or by focusing only on relatively successful episodes, it is likely
that the sample of episodes identified here may be biased in the sense of being
associated with a more positive economic outlook around stabilization time (that
is, higher growth, better external accounts, etc.). While no systematic attempt to
correct these potential biases is made in this paper, the issue is informally taken
into account when interpreting the results.
In the following sections, Easterly’s sample, which will be denoted as Sample
1, and the sample arising from using Criterion (3), which will be referred to as
Sample 2, will be used. It is hoped that a comparison of the results generated by
each of these samples will shed some light about whether the identified stylized
facts are robust to changes in the precise statistical definition of a stabilization
episode. In particular, the fact that 17 of the 28 episodes shared by both samples
are dated differently will provide a robustness check against the rule followed for
timing stabilization episodes.
II. Nominal Anchors and Stylized Facts
Sample 1 was split into ERBS and OS in Easterly (1996). ERBS were identified
as cases in which the exchange rate was fixed as part of the program and the
country had current account convertibility.12 Of the 28 programs in Easterly’s
sample, 9 were found to be ERBS. For Sample 2, the identification of ERBS was
based on a two-stage procedure. First, information was obtained from the empir-
ical literature on ERBS, as well as from IMF staff reports in the cases in which
IMF-supported programs were in place at the time of stabilization. This first step
led to the identification of 13 ERBS. For each of the remaining programs, the joint
condition of a fixed exchange rate and current account convertibility was checked;
this check did not reveal any additional ERBS. Table 2 shows the breakdown of
Samples 1 and 2 into ERBS and OS. Since the stabilization dates in Samples 1 and
2 were obtained using a mechanical rule, the last column of Table 2 provides the
dates in which exchange rates were actually pegged for the ERBS. The rules-
determined and historical dates coincide in only 3 of the 13 ERBS in Sample 2.
The historical date precedes the rules-determined date by one year in seven cases,
and by two years in the remaining three cases.
The following subsections study the behavior of several macroeconomic vari-
ables during a seven-year window—from t–3 to t+3, where t is the stabilization
year.13 As a rule, the sample median, and a 95 percent confidence interval around
it, are shown for each variable. Median was selected over the mean because
sample means are in most cases seriously affected by a few extreme values; as a
result, standard deviations and, thus, confidence intervals around the means tend
to be extremely wide, rendering comparisons of means largely meaningless.
Javier Hamann
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12Due to the absence of current account convertibility, the stabilization programs in Bangladesh 1975
and Ghana 1984 were not considered ERBS.
13It must be stressed here that Easterly’s (1996) study focuses on growth and, unlike this paper, does
not look at the behavior of the other variables associated with the ERBS syndrome. In this sense, Sample
1 is an extension of that used by Easterly.EXCHANGE-RATE-BASED STABILIZATION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STYLIZED FACTS
119
Table 2. Stabilization Episodes: Anchors
Easterly (1996) Sample Alternative Sample ERBS 
Exchange rate Exchange rate Historical 
Date anchor Date anchor Dates1
Argentina 1 1977
Argentina 2 1980 Yes 1979
Argentina 3 1986 Yes 1985
Argentina 4 1990 Yes 1991 Yes 1991
Bangladesh 1975 1975
Bolivia 1986 1986
Brazil 1 1965 Yes 1966 Yes 1964
Brazil 2 1991
Chile 1 1965
Chile 2 1974 1975
Congo, Democratic
Republic of 1 1969
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 2 1980
Congo, Democratic
Republic of 3 1984 1985
Costa Rica 1983 1983
Dominican Republic 1991 1992
Ecuador 1 1990
Ecuador 2 1993 Yes 1994 Yes 1993
Ghana 1 1978
Ghana 2 1984 1985
Guinea 1988
Guinea Bissau 1 1990
Guinea Bissau 2 1993 1993
Guyana 1992
Iceland 1 1975 1976
Iceland 2 1984 Yes 1984 Yes 1983
Indonesia 1967 1967





Mexico 2 1988 Yes 1989 Yes 1988
Mozambique 1988
Nicaragua 1991 Yes 1991 Yes 1991
Nigeria 1989 1990
Peru 1 1986 Yes 1986
Peru 2 1991 1991
São Tomé & Principe 1992
Sierra Leone 1 1988
Sierra Leone 2 1992 1992
Somalia 1 1981 1982
Somalia 2 1985 1985Financial Discipline
The key argument in favor of selecting an exchange rate anchor during disinfla-
tion relates to its ability to strengthen domestic financial discipline. The argument
is that a credible commitment to a highly visible variable such as the exchange rate
(as opposed to an inflation or money target) will be a relatively more effective way
to eliminate an “inflation bias” in wage and financial contracts, and would provide
a better incentive to produce the fiscal adjustment needed for the sustainability of
low inflation and the viability of the peg itself.14 The theoretical merits of this
argument aside, the empirical evidence on the ability of pegged exchange rates to
strengthen financial discipline is mixed. After controlling for several factors,
Edwards (1993) finds that countries that pegged their exchange rates at the begin-
ning of the 1980s were financially more responsible than those with a more flex-
ible exchange rate regime. However, in various studies Tornell and Velasco
(1995a, 1995b, 1998) find no evidence in support of the view that the adoption of
an exchange rate anchor imposes stronger fiscal discipline. Tornell and Velasco
(1995b) show that during the 1980s, fiscal discipline was stronger among sub-
Saharan countries with flexible exchange rate regimes than among those with
fixed exchange rates (the franc zone countries); while Tornell and Velasco (1998)
and (1995a) find that fiscal adjustment was stronger, and occurred more often, in
money-based stabilizations (MBS) than in ERBS in Latin America.
Javier Hamann
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14See, for example, the chapter on exchange rate regimes and financial discipline in Aghevli, Khan,
and Montiel (1991).
Table 2. (concluded)
Easterly (1996) Sample Alternative Sample ERBS 
Exchange rate Exchange rate Historical 
Date anchor Date anchor Dates1
Syrian Arab Republic 1988
Turkey 1981 1981
Uganda 1 1981 1982
Uganda 2 1988 1989
Uruguay 1 1968 Yes 1969 Yes 1968
Uruguay 2 1976
Uruguay 3 1980 Yes 1981 Yes 1979
Uruguay 4 1992 Yes 1991
Zambia 1994
Total number of episodes 28 51
Exchange-rate-based 
stabilizations 9 13
Sources: Easterly (1996), IFS, and national sources.
1Year in which exchange rates were actually pegged, if peg occurred within the first six months
of the year; the following year if peg occurred during the last six months of the year.The issue of financial discipline is discussed here in terms of the behavior of
inflation pre- and post-stabilization and the evolution of fiscal and monetary vari-
ables. A comparison of the actual reduction in inflation between ERBS and OS is,
in principle, not a valid way of judging the relative merits of these strategies in
reducing inflation (especially when no control is made for the paths targeted for
the exchange rate and money). Nonetheless, some (weak) results in favor of the
financial discipline effect of exchange rate anchors emerge from Figures 1 and 2.
According to both samples, inflation in the pre-stabilization years is higher in
ERBS than in OS (at least 20 percentage points in the level of inflation), and yet
post-stabilization inflation is lower in ERBS, although the difference is relatively
small.15 And three years after stabilization, inflation is lower in ERBS than in OS
in both samples. As before, however, differences in inflation performance between
ERBS and OS are not statistically significant. Differences across regimes in the
behavior of money growth rates are less clear; in particular, there is almost no
difference in the average of median rates of money growth in the post-stabilization
years, suggesting that real money balances grow faster after stabilization in ERBS
than in OS.
The bottom panels of Figures 1 and 2 provide no evidence consistent with the
view that fiscal discipline is stronger in ERBS. Fiscal adjustment in year t is
stronger in ERBS in Sample 1 (1
1⁄4 p.p. of GDP vs. 1⁄4 p.p. in OS) but weaker in
Sample 2 (
3⁄4 p.p. of GDP vs. 11⁄2 p.p. in OS).16 When the cumulative change in the
fiscal balance from t–1 to t+1 is considered, however, adjustment under OS is
stronger (1
3⁄4 p.p. of GDP vs. 11⁄2 p.p. in ERBS in Sample 1; 1 p.p. of GDP vs. –
3⁄4
p.p. in ERBS in Sample 2). Fiscal balances deteriorate in the second or third post-
stabilization years in all cases, but in no case do fiscal balances in year t+3 fall
below their level in year t–1. To the extent that the difference in fiscal balances
between years t+3 and t–1 can be considered as an indicator of the “durability”
of the initial fiscal adjustment, better results are obtained in OS.
Important differences in pre-stabilization patterns of fiscal balances exist
between ERBS and OS. Clearly, pre-stabilization fiscal deficits tend to be smaller
in ERBS than in OS (about 3
1⁄2 percent of GDP in ERBS vs. 5 percent of GDP in
OS in both samples), suggesting that the prevailing fiscal situation may be a factor
in the selection of an anchor during stabilization. On the other hand, adjustment in
the runup to stabilization (from t–3 to t–1) is not necessarily greater under one
type of program: the improvement in fiscal balance is larger in ERBS in Sample
1, but (slightly) larger in OS in Sample 2.
The ERBS Syndrome
As mentioned earlier, the main stylized facts of the ERBS syndrome identified in
the literature are: a boom-bust cycle (as opposed to the initial recessionary effects
EXCHANGE-RATE-BASED STABILIZATION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STYLIZED FACTS
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15Notice that in the cases of inflation and money growth the charts show a transformation, X/(1+X),
rather than the actual level of the variable in order to prevent the width of the associated confidence
interval from obscuring the changes in the median.
16The abbreviation “p.p.” is used to denote “percentage points.”Javier Hamann
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ERBS: Inflation1 OS: Inflation1
ERBS: Growth of M21 OS: Growth of M21
ERBS: Central government balance
(in percent of GDP)
OS: Central government balance























































t+3 t+2 t+1 t t–1 t–2 t–3
Figure 1. Sample 1: Inflation, Monetary and Fiscal Accounts
Sources: IFS, national sources, and author’s estimates.
1The following transformation was used: x = X/(1 + X).EXCHANGE-RATE-BASED STABILIZATION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STYLIZED FACTS
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ERBS: Inflation1 OS: Inflation1
ERBS: Growth of M21 OS: Growth of M21
ERBS: Central government balance
(in percent of GDP)
OS: Central government balance

















































t+3 t+2 t+1 t t–1 t–2 t–3
Figure 2. Sample 2: Inflation, Monetary and Fiscal Accounts
Sources: IFS, national sources, and author’s estimates.
1The following transformation was used: x = X/(1 + X).of money-based stabilizations); a consumption (and sometimes also an invest-
ment) boom; a pronounced real exchange rate appreciation; and worsening trade
and current account balances. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the behavior of GDP and per-capita GDP growth around
stabilization for both ERBS and OS in both samples. There appears to be no
evidence from either sample of a “recession now vs. recession later” trade-off
involved in the selection of nominal anchors. A slowdown in growth does occur in
ERBS, as GDP growth rates decline by about 1
1⁄2 p.p. two or three years after stabi-
lization; this trend is clearer when per capita GDP growth rates are considered. But
there is no evidence of a recession during (or following) stabilization in OS.
Despite relatively wide confidence intervals in some cases, Figures 3 and 4 show
that growth performance improves during inflation stabilization and its immediate
aftermath both in ERBS and OS.
The behavior of private consumption (as a percentage of GDP) does differ in
ERBS and OS, as shown in Figure 5, but the key differences are statistically signif-
icant only in Sample 1. The top left panel of Figure 5 shows a sizeable (nearly 3
p.p. of GDP) and statistically significant increase in the private consumption-to-
GDP ratio in the stabilization year, followed by an additionally (albeit smaller and
not statistically significant) increase in year t+1. The bottom left panel shows
similar, but not statistically significant, results for Sample 2. Nothing remotely
similar to this result can be found in the case of OS in either sample. Thus, there
seems to be some statistical support to the “consumption boom” element of the
ERBS syndrome described in the literature. 
Investment behavior in the post-stabilization years also tends to differ between
OS and ERBS, as shown in Figure 6. In ERBS investment does not deviate consid-
erably from its value in year t during the post-stabilization years, except for a 1
p.p. of GDP fall in year t+3 in Sample 2. The picture is quite different in OS,
where an increasingly positive deviation can be detected, especially in Sample 1
(investment in year t+3 is 3 p.p. of GDP higher than in year t, although the differ-
ence is not statistically significant). In Sample 2, the differences between invest-
ment in years t+ 2 and t+ 3 and its value in year t are smaller, but statistically
significant. In the pre-stabilization years, the clearest development is a decline of
at least 1 p.p. of GDP in investment in year t–1 in all cases; only in ERBS in
Sample 2 does investment decline for two years prior to stabilization (the cumula-
tive decline is 2
1⁄2 p.p. of GDP). Thus, there is no evidence of an investment boom
in ERBS, and instead, there is weak evidence suggesting that investment falls
somewhat in the runup to stabilization in all cases. There appears to be somewhat
stronger evidence suggesting that investment recovers more sluggishly or not at all
in post-stabilization years following ERBS.
Moderate differences in the behavior of the current account balance in pre- and
post-stabilization years seem to exist between ERBS and OS (Figure 7). In the case
of ERBS, Samples 1 and 2 show changes in different directions in current account
balances in the stabilization year and a deterioration following stabilization, although
this trend is not statistically significant. In OS, on the other hand, there is no change
in the median current account balance in the stabilization year and no clear pattern in
post-stabilization years. Furthermore, the behavior of the current account balance
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ERBS: Growth of GDP per capita OS: Growth of GDP per capita
Figure 3. Sample 1: Growth of GDP and Per Capita GDP During Disinflation
Sources: IFS, national sources, and author’s estimates.Javier Hamann
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ERBS: Growth of GDP per capita OS: Growth of GDP per capita
Figure 4. Sample 2: Growth of GDP and Per Capita GDP During Disinflation
Sources: IFS, national sources, and author’s estimates.EXCHANGE-RATE-BASED STABILIZATION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STYLIZED FACTS
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ERBS (Sample 1): Private consumption
(deviations from value in year t)
OS (Sample 1): Private consumption
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ERBS (Sample 2): Private consumption
(deviations from value in year t)
OS (Sample 2): Private consumption
(deviations from value in year t)
Figure 5. Private Consumption During Disinflation
(In percent of GDP)
Sources: IFS, national sources, and author’s estimates.Javier Hamann
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ERBS (Sample 1): Investment
(deviations from value in year t)
OS (Sample 1): Investment
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ERBS (Sample 2): Investment
(deviations from value in year t)
OS (Sample 2): Investment
(deviations from value in year t)
Figure 6. Investment During Disinflation
(In percent of GDP)
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ERBS (Sample 1): Current account balance
(deviations from value in year t)
OS (Sample 1): Current account balance
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ERBS (Sample 2): Current account balance
(deviations from value in year t)
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Figure 7. The Current Account During Disinflation
(In percent of GDP)
Sources: IFS, national sources, and author’s estimates.provides another example of important differences in pre-stabilization dynamics,
which may be indicative of endogeneity of anchor selection: the median deviations
from values recorded in the stabilization year indicate an improvement in current
account balances in ERBS (between years t–2 and t–1 in Sample 1 and between
years t–3 and t–1 in Sample 2), but only minimal changes in OS.
Figure 8 shows some additional, but weak, evidence in support of one of the
elements of the ERBS syndrome. The trends exhibited by the real exchange rate
differ markedly between ERBS and OS: real exchange rates tend to appreciate
before and after stabilization when the exchange rate is used as an anchor, but
tend to depreciate before and after stabilization in OS. These changes are not
statistically significant, however. Interestingly, there is a sizeable (about 10–20
percent) depreciation in year t – 2 in all cases, which is consistent with the
notion of restoration of external equilibrium prior to inflation stabilization
discussed earlier. Quite clearly, in the ERBS the real appreciation is not only a
post-stabilization phenomenon; in fact, for this to be the case ERBS would have
had to be dated two years too late on average. Otherwise there is room to ponder
whether policymakers may not have been managing the exchange rate with the
purpose of lowering inflationary expectations for some time before they adopted
a publicly-announced ERBS. There is also the possibility that, before the
exchange rate was used explicitly as an anchor, tight monetary policy may have
led to an appreciation before it caused a reduction in (average) inflation. On the
other hand, for OS there is no clear evidence of real appreciation prior to infla-
tion stabilization, except for a sizeable but not statistically significant apprecia-
tion in year t – 1 in Sample 1.
Using a sample similar to those used by the studies that first identified the
ERBS syndrome, Gould (1996) found that the choice of nominal anchor is
endogenously determined by the prevailing level of international reserves.
Figure 9 provides some evidence of a possible systematic difference in the
behavior of reserves prior to stabilization in ERBS and OS. Between years t – 3
and t gross international reserves are generally higher in ERBS than in OS (3
1⁄2
months of imports vs. 13⁄4 in Sample 1; 41⁄2 months of imports vs. 2 months in OS
in Sample 2). It must be stressed, however, that confidence intervals are quite
wide in the case of ERBS and these differences in reserve levels are not statisti-
cally significant.
The difference in reserve holdings between ERBS and OS in post-stabilization
years is minimal (3 vs. 2
1⁄2 months in Sample 1; 31⁄2 vs. 3 months in Sample 2). The
similarity in levels in post-stabilization years reflects two opposite trends: in ERBS
reserves fall in the stabilization year and, although they recover somewhat in the
following years, they do not reach their pre-stabilization peak. In OS, on the other
hand, there is a general upward trend in reserves around stabilization; this increase
occurs in years t+1 and t+ 2 in Sample 1 and between years t–1 and t+1 in
Sample 2. The different trends are unequivocal in year t, when inflation first comes
down: reserves are falling under ERBS but going up under OS, although these
changes are not statistically significant. A possible interpretation of the fact that
reserves tend to increase in OS in post-stabilization years is that they really are not
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exchange rate
OS (Sample 1): Real effective 
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Figure 8. The Real Exchange Rate During Disinflation
(Value in year t = 100)
Sources: IFS, national sources, and author’s estimates.Javier Hamann
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Figure 9. International Reserves During Disinflation
(In months of imports)
Sources: IFS, national sources, and author’s estimates.pure MBS. Rather, these programs may involve some form of intervention in the
foreign exchange market in order to facilitate the remonetization of the economy.17
Success or Failure of ERBS
The ERBS literature often mentions a relatively high rate of failure among ERBS,
but no formal claim has been made about a systematic tendency for one type of
stabilization program to succeed or fail more frequently than the other. One could
argue, however, that ERBS is an intrinsically riskier disinflation strategy because,
by targeting the exchange rate, policymakers provide speculators with the oppor-
tunity of a one-sided bet, and thus, these programs can potentially fail even in
cases where failure is not warranted by macroeconomic fundamentals. On the
other hand, as has been discussed earlier, it has been argued that committing to a
fixed exchange rate raises the game’s stakes and, therefore, that it is more likely to
impose financial discipline, ultimately raising the probability of success. Looking
at the rates of success of both ERBS and OS in the stabilization programs studied
in Sample 2 can shed some light on the empirical relevance of these issues. 
There is no obvious, clear-cut definition of success that can be used here, espe-
cially considering that, by following a rule that defines a stabilization episode as
one that produced an actual decline in inflation that lasted for at least two years,
one is already biasing the sample somewhat in the direction of success, however
defined. Success would then have to be related to a program’s ability to keep infla-
tion low for some time beyond the two-year horizon. In principle, it is tempting to
require a relatively large number of years of stability to consider a program truly
successful. However, there is a risk associated with using too large a number. If a
program brings inflation down and keeps it down for, say, five years but then infla-
tion spirals out of control beginning in year six, was the original program ulti-
mately unsuccessful? Or could the new inflationary episode be the creation of a
different economic team working in a different policy environment? Or could the
economy have been hit by an extraordinarily adverse shock? It seems that the
longer the number of years of low inflation required to consider a stabilization
successful, the higher the risk that some truly successful program may be recorded
as a failure.
Success was defined on the basis of inflation performance on the second and
third post-stabilization years (t+ 2 and t+ 3). An obvious advantage of limiting the
horizon to t+ 3 is that a verdict (successful or not) could be reached for all 51
programs in Sample 2. Several rules were tried, of which two were selected, essen-
tially because they did not produce extreme rates of success or failure:
• Success—Criterion (1): during the second and third post-stabilization years,
inflation remains at or below whatever level inflation reached during the stabi-
lization year.
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17This would explain why OS are not found to be recessionary, as would be expected in the case of pure
MBS. I am indebted to Martin Uribe for this point. His 1999 paper (see the Reference section) provides a
detailed comparison of pure MBS vs. those that allow for an initial remonetization of the economy.• Success—Criterion (2): during the second and third post-stabilization years,
inflation remains at or below three-quarters of the inflation rate prevailing the
year before stabilization.18
The results are reported in Table 3. According to Criterion (1), which is more
restrictive, 20 of the 51 programs were successful. Among ERBS, 5 out of the 13
programs were successful, which implies the same rate of success for ERBS (38
percent) as for OS (39 percent). If Criterion (2) is used, 34 out of the 51 programs
can be considered successful. Interestingly, of the 13 ERBS episodes 9 are now
considered successful, which, again, implies a similar rate of success for ERBS
(69 percent) as for OS (66 percent). There is no evidence, therefore, to support the
view that programs associated with one or the other anchor are generally more
successful.
III. Summary and Conclusions
This paper explores whether the distinctive features of ERBS identified in the
literature for a group of Latin American countries and Israel also appear in a larger
and somewhat different sample. In the construction of this sample, stabilization
episodes are identified and timed by applying a simple rule to a data set of annual
inflation rates for the period 1960–97 for a group of 143 countries. Additional
evidence supporting the notion that the sample indeed contains stabilization
episodes, as opposed to simply positive supply shocks, is provided. In order to
gauge the robustness of the results, an alternative sample constructed by Easterly
(1996) is also used.
The results are not totally supportive of the ERBS syndrome described in the
literature. There is no evidence of a “recession now vs. recession later” trade-off
between ERBS and OS; in fact, growth performance during stabilization is good
under both anchors, as had been found by Easterly (1996). There appears to be a
distinctive consumption boom during ERBS, but not an investment boom; invest-
ment seems to recover more sluggishly after ERBS than in other stabilization
programs. The real exchange rate does appreciate following ERBS and depreciate
in other cases, but these movements are not statistically significant. The current
account does not exhibit a clear trend in post-stabilization years. There is also no
evidence that fiscal discipline is enhanced by the adoption of an exchange rate
anchor, or that there are any systematic differences in the records of success of
ERBS and OS. 
The results of this paper seem to warrant formal testing of various hypotheses
related to the effects of inflation stabilization. For example, the fact that in several
instances there are substantial differences between ERBS and OS not only in post-
stabilization but also in pre-stabilization years may suggest that the selection of a
nominal anchor is in itself an endogenous phenomenon—as has already been
suggested elsewhere. This would shed some light on the potential role of initial
conditions as determinants of post-stabilization dynamics. The effect on growth
Javier Hamann
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Table 3. Sample 2: Successful Stabilization Episodes
Exchange
Stabilization Rate Successful
Date Anchor Criterion 1 Criterion 2
Argentina 1 1977 Yes Yes
Argentina 2 1980 Yes
Argentina 3 1986 Yes
Argentina 4 1991 Yes Yes Yes
Bangladesh 1975 Yes Yes
Bolivia 1986 Yes Yes
Brazil 1 1966 Yes Yes Yes
Brazil 2 1991 Yes
Chile 1 1965 Yes Yes
Chile 2 1975 Yes Yes
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1 1969 Yes
Congo, Democratic Republic of 2 1980
Congo, Democratic Republic of 3 1985
Costa Rica 1983 Yes Yes
Dominican Republic 1992 Yes
Ecuador 1 1990 Yes




Guinea Bissau 2 1990
Guinea Bissau 3 1993 Yes
Guyana 1992 Yes Yes
Iceland 1 1976
Iceland 2 1984 Yes Yes
Indonesia 1967 Yes
Israel 1986 Yes Yes Yes
Jamaica 1993 Yes
Lebanon 1 1988 Yes Yes
Lebanon 2 1993 Yes Yes
Mexico 1 1984
Mexico 2 1989 Yes Yes
Mozambique 1988 Yes Yes
Nicaragua 1991 Yes Yes Yes
Nigeria 1990
Peru 1 1986 Yes
Peru 2 1991 Yes Yes
São Tomé & Principe 1992
Sierra Leone 1 1988 Yes
Sierra Leone 2 1992 Yes Yes
Somalia 1 1982
Somalia 2 1985
Syrian Arab Republic 1988 Yes Yes
Turkey 1981 Yes
Uganda 1 1982
Uganda 2 1989 Yes Yesperformance during disinflation of the pre-existing level of inflation, or of the
duration of high inflation, also deserves attention. And, of course, several of the
elements of the ERBS syndrome need to be reexamined in a context that explic-
itly accounts for other phenomena and uses a larger control group than the one that
has been typically used.
Finally, the data do not provide strong indications that the rules used for
selecting a sample of stabilization episodes has systematically timed stabilization
episodes incorrectly. There is only weak evidence supporting the view that infla-
tion stabilization is found to be expansionary just because the “dirty work” of
macroeconomic correction, in the form of correction of external imbalances, may
have preceded inflation stabilization by a year or two. Further work with higher
frequency data is needed, however, to deepen our understanding of the dynamics
of disinflation under different nominal anchors.19
APPENDIX I
Sources of Data
The IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) was the main source of data for all variables,
except for the current account and the real exchange rate. Current account data from the IMF’s
World Economic Outlook (WEO) database was used, except for one case (Brazil 1963–69)
where, due to the lack of data on the current account, trade balance data from IFS had to be
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19An (admittedly crude) attempt at comparing the dynamics of interest rates between ERBS and OS
was made, using monthly data for the stabilization year. This exercise revealed no clear differences in the
behavior of real interest rates across stabilization strategies: real (deposit or T-bill) interest rates exhibited
no trend during the year; were somewhat more volatile in the case of OS; and averaged about 4 percent




Date Anchor Criterion 1 Criterion 2
Uruguay 1 1969 Yes Yes
Uruguay 2 1976
Uruguay 3 1981 Yes
Uruguay 4 1992 Yes Yes Yes
Zambia 1994 Yes Yes
Total number of episodes 51 20 34
Successful programs in percent
of total programs (39%) (67%)
Exchange-rate-based stabilizations 13 5 9
Successful ERBS programs in 
percent of ERBS programs (38%) (69%)
Sources: Easterly (1996), IFS, and national sources.used. In several instances, data from national sources were needed to fill some gaps (especially
in the oldest episodes), or when IFS data contained breaks (typically in the case of the popula-
tion variable, which was needed to compute GDP per capita). The fiscal data refers to the
central government. For the real exchange rate, a multilateral real effective exchange rate vari-
able was available from an IMF internal database from 1980 onwards. For countries for which
this variable was not available, or in cases where data prior to 1980 was needed, a bilateral real
exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar was constructed.
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